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PREVIEW; State v. Walker:  
Evidentiary Challenges in Sexual Crimes 
 
Riley Wavra  
 
Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, August 8, 2018 at 
9:30 A.M in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court in 
Helena, Montana. Quentin M. Rhoades is expected to argue on 
behalf of the Appellant, Randall Bryce Walker (“Mr. Walker”), 
while Assistant Attorney General, Michael S. Wellenstein, is 
expected to argue on behalf of the State of Montana (“State”).  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 This case presents the Court with three distinct evidentiary 
issues that could expand the evidence available to defendants 
during the prosecution of sexual crimes. The Court must first 
determine if the district court properly excluded evidence of Mr. 
Walker’s psychosexual makeup.1 Second, the Court must 
determine whether the district court properly applied Montana’s 
Rape Shield Statute.2 Finally, the Court must determine whether 
the district court erroneously excluded Mr. Walker’s polygraph-
related evidence.3   
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
  The parties agree that on the morning of February 14, 
2015, Mr. Walker’s step-daughter, R.W., awoke in her bedroom, 
entered her parent’s bedroom and climbed into bed next to her 
stepfather.4 Mr. Walker and R.W. were home alone.5 R.W. later 
told a family friend, Hannah Billet, that while in the bed, Mr. 
Walker sexually abused her.6 The incident was reported to the 
Ravalli County Sheriff’s Office.7  Mr. Walker has continually 
                                                          
1 Appellant’s Principal Brief at 1, State v. Walker, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/9/1277/url/321Z246_03W91
0E6F001MRG.pdf  (Mont. Oct. 23, 2017) (No. DA 17-0045). 
2 Id. 
3 Id.  
4 Id.at 8; Brief of Appellee at 3, State v. Walker, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/1/385/url/321Z24V_04E6W
YVSR00007M.pdf  (Mont. Apr. 27, 2018) (No. DA 17-0045). 
5 Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 7; Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, 
at 3.   
6 Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 6; Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, 
at 5–6. 
7 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 6.  
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denied that anything sexual happened, and instead asserts that on 
the morning of February 14, R.W. entered the bed and made sexual 
advances towards him which he immediately rejected.8   
The State charged Mr. Walker with incest on April 6, 
2015.9 On July 22, 2015, Mr. Walker’s step-daughter from a 
former marriage, A.W., accused him of sexually abusing her from 
ages 7 to 12.10 The State subsequently amended the original 
Information, adding an additional charge of incest for Mr. 
Walker’s alleged sexual abuse of A.W. and a count of sexual 
assault for each episode.11 A jury trial ensued, during which 
several family members and friends provided testimony in support 
of  either R.W., A.W., or Mr. Walker.12 No physical evidence 
including DNA, bodily fluids, or physical manifestations of the 
alleged abuse was introduced.13 On August 19, 2016, Mr. Walker 
was convicted on all counts and sentenced to four 100-year 
concurrent sentences.14 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS  
A. Appellant Randall B. Walker 
 Mr. Walker argues that the district court’s exclusion of his 
expert witness, Dr. Robert Page, was trial error that the prosecution 
cannot show to be harmless.15 Dr. Page would have testified that 
the results of Mr. Walker’s psychosexual evaluation showed he 
was not sexually attracted to children.16 Mr. Walker argues such 
evidence is relevant because “knowingly having sexual contact 
with two different pre-adolescent girls” is an essential element of 
what the State had to prove.17 Further, Dr. Page’s testimony would 
make it less probable that Mr. Walker knowingly had sexual 
contact with the alleged victims.18 Finally, Mr. Walker contends 
that the district court incorrectly concluded that such evidence 
would be used for the improper purpose of bolstering his own 
credibility, as Dr. Page would only have testified as to his clinical 
                                                          
8 Id. at 7–8.; Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 4–5.  
9 Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 1.  
10 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 11.  
11 Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 1–2.  
12 Id. at 4–13; Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 2–15.  
13 Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 4.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 21.  
16 Id. at 22.  
17 Id. at 23. 
18 Id. at 23–24, 27. 
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findings without evaluating the truthfulness of either Mr. Walker 
or the alleged victims.19 
 Next, Mr. Walker argues that the district court erroneously 
excluded testimony about R.W.’s past sexual history, claiming that 
it mechanically applied Montana’s Rape Shield Statute as if it was 
a per se ban on any sexual history of a victim.20 According to Mr. 
Walker, the district court should have balanced the competing 
interests of the victim and himself before excluding the evidence.21 
The proffered evidence involved an incident in which R.W. 
allegedly touched her step-cousins private parts in a sexual 
manner. 22 Mr. Walker argues that evidence of R.W.’s prior sexual 
history would have supported his theory that on the morning the 
alleged abuse occurred, R.W. was acting out in a sexual manner.23   
 Finally, Mr. Walker argues that the district court erred in 
excluding the results of his polygraph examination, which would 
have been presented in the form of expert testimony by the test’s 
examiner, Dick Stotts.24 Mr. Walker contends that the district court 
incorrectly enforced a per se ban on polygraph evidence rather 
than treating it as they would any other form of expert witness 
testimony.25 In support of this contention, Mr. Walker points out 
that Montana’s statutory ban on polygraph evidence was repealed 
in 1994.26 Therefore, Mr. Walker argues the district court should 
follow Montana’s pattern of admitting even “shaky” expert 
evidence and let the jury assimilate, assess, and apply the 
testimony.27 
B. Appellee State of Montana 
 The State asserts that the district court correctly excluded 
the expert testimony of Dr. Page.28 The State maintains that such 
testimony would have improperly bolstered Mr. Walker’s 
credibility by indirectly supporting his assertion that he did not 
                                                          
19 Id. at 27; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, State v. Walker, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/1/373/url/321Z25S_053VM7
F9W000038.pdf (Mont. May 25, 2018) (No. DA 17-0045). 
20 Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 35-36.  
21 Id. at 36.  
22 Id. at 37.  
23 Id. at 38.  
24 Id. at 2, 40.  
25 Id. at 43; Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 19, at 11–12. 
26 Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 42. 
27 Id. at 46–47. 
28 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 18–28.  
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engage in sexual contact with the victims.29 Further, the State 
asserts that such testimony would have improperly attacked the 
validity of the victim’s allegations that they were sexually abused 
by Mr. Walker.30   
 Next, the State contends that the district court properly 
applied Montana’s Rape Shield Statute when it excluded evidence 
of R.W.’s prior sexual history.31 In support, the State argues that 
the district court’s application was not improper because they 
heard argument from both parties on the evidence’s admissibly 
prior to excluding it.32 That is, the district court did not exclude the 
evidence on the basis that it was per se inadmissible, but rather on 
the basis of the arguments made by each party.   
The State also asserts that Mr. Walker has changed his 
argument on appeal, now arguing that such evidence would have 
supported his theory that R.W. was acting out in a sexual manner 
on the morning in question.33 The State maintains that Mr. Walker 
argued below that such evidence was necessary to refute the 
State’s theory that R.W. was sexually aware because of his 
abuse.34 Lastly, the State maintains that Mr. Walker sought to 
introduce the evidence for the improper purpose of making “his 
trial a trial of R.W.’s alleged prior sexual conduct.”35  
Finally, the State argues that the district court correctly 
excluded the polygraph-related evidence.36 The State asserts that 
the Court has consistently held that polygraph evidence is not 
admissible.37 The State contends that since the Legislature repealed 
Montana’s per se ban on polygraph evidence this conclusion has 
been reached several times.38 Therefore, the State argues that the 
district court did not rely on a repealed statute, but rather on the 
longstanding legal principle in Montana that polygraph evidence is 
inadmissible.39  
 
                                                          
29 Id. at 28. 
30 Id. at 26.  
31 Id. at 28–38. 
32 Id. at 34.  
33 Id. at 36.  
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 38. 
36 Id. at 38–39.  
37 Id. at 38.  
38 Id. at 38–39. 
39 Id. at 39.  
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IV. ANALYSIS  
A. Psychosexual Evidence  
 The admissibility of Dr. Page’s expert testimony poses a 
difficult question for the Court. Expert testimony may not be 
offered specifically to bolster the credibility of a party or their 
claims.40 The parties do not dispute this rule, rather they disagree 
on whether the testimony in question would have done so. This 
presents to the Court what appears to be a novel question: may 
expert testimony be offered if it would inadvertently bolster the 
credibility of a party. 
 Mr. Walker maintains that Dr. Page’s testimony would not 
have included direct commentary on anyone’s credibility.41 
Nonetheless, such testimony would have bolstered Mr. Walker’s 
claim that he did not engage in sexual contact with R.W. or A.W., 
albeit not directly. The policy behind excluding such evidence is 
that it would improperly invade the province of the jury by 
“placing a stamp of scientific legitimacy on a victim's allegations, 
or by dismissing the validity of the allegations.”42 This remains a 
compelling basis for exclusion. Because the proposed testimony 
would have eroded the credibility of R.W. and A.W.’s allegations 
that they were sexually abused while simultaneously bolstering 
Mr. Walker’s own claim of innocence, the Court will likely affirm 
the district court’s ruling.  
B. Montana’s Rape Shield Statute 
 The Court will likely hold that the district court properly 
applied Montana’s Rape Shield Statute. Both parties correctly note 
that Montana’s Rape Shield Statute cannot be applied 
mechanistically.43 Rather, courts must balance the defendant’s 
right to present a defense with the victim’s right to protection 
under the statute.44 Speculative or unsupported statements of a 
victim’s prior sexual history are not enough to tip the scales in 
                                                          
40 State v. Bailey, 87 P.3d 1032, 1039 (Mont. 2004) (emphasis added).  
41 Appellant’s Principle Brief, supra note 1, at 21, 24. 
42 Benjamin v. Torgerson, 985 P.2d 734, 740 (Mont. 1999) (internal citations 
omitted).  
43 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 32; Appellant’s Principle Brief, supra note 
1, at 36; State v. Colburn, 366 P.3d 258, 263 (Mont. 2016).  
44 Colburn, 336 P.3d at 263 (citing State v. Lindberg, 196 P.3d 1252, 1264 
(Mont. 2008)).  
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favor of admissibility.45 Further, Montana’s Rape Shield Statute 
enumerates its exceptions, providing that evidence of past sexual 
conduct of the victim is only admissible if it: (1) involves sexual 
conduct with the alleged offender; or (2) is offered to “show the 
origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease that is at issue in the 
prosecution.”46  
 The evidence Mr. Walker sought to have admitted was an 
unsupported secondhand account of the incident.47 This stands in 
contrast to Colburn, where the Court concluded that the proposed 
prior sexual history evidence was neither speculative nor 
unsupported as the victim’s father was convicted on charges 
stemming from the abuse.48 Further, the district court heard 
argument for and against the admission of the evidence prior to 
excluding it.49 That is not an improper application. Additionally, 
the evidence does not fit into either of the statutorily enumerated 
exceptions to the inadmissibility of prior sexual history evidence in 
Montana. Finally, if the State is correct in its assertion that Mr. 
Walker has changed his argument in favor of admission on appeal, 
then the Court will not consider it.50 It is unlikely that the Court 
will overturn the district court’s ruling.  
C. Polygraph Evidence 
 The Court will likely affirm the district court’s exclusion of 
polygraph-related evidence. The Montana Supreme Court has 
resisted the use of polygraph evidence in any Montana court 
proceeding, long after the repeal of Montana’s per se statutory ban 
in 1994.51 While Mr. Walker correctly notes that Montana no 
longer has a per se statutory ban on polygraph-related evidence, 
the Court has strongly adhered to the legal principle that such 
evidence is inadmissible in Montana. These subsequent decisions 
                                                          
45 State v. Awbery, 367 P.3d 346, 350 (Mont. 2016); Lindberg, 196 P.3d at 1264 
(Mont. 2008); State v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Mont. 1998); State v. 
Rhyne, 833 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Mont. 1992); State v. Laird, 732 P.2d 417, 420 
(Mont. 1987).  
46 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–511(2). 
47 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 37; Appellant’s Principle Brief, supra note 
1, at 37.  
48 336 P.3d at 263. 
49 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 34.  
50 State v. Henderson, 877 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Mont. 1994) (holding that it is 
axiomatic that a party may not advance a novel argument on appeal). 
51 State v. Hameline, 188 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Mont. 2008); In re N.V., 87 P.3d 
510, 514 (Mont. 2004); State v. DuBray, 77 P.3d 247, 263 (Mont. 2003); State 
v. Anderson, 977 P.2d 315, 317 (Mont. 1999); In re Marriage of Njos, 889 P.2d 
1192, 1197 (Mont. 1995).  
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have been rendered without reliance on the now-repealed statute.  
The Court is unlikely to deviate from their prior decisions in this 
case.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 The Court will likely affirm all three of the district court’s 
evidentiary rulings.  Dr. Page’s testimony would have improperly 
bolstered the credibility of Mr. Walker while attacking the validity 
of the victims’ allegations. The district court properly applied 
Montana’s Rape Shield Statute, and the proffered evidence does 
not meet any of the enumerated exceptions to Montana’s ban on 
such evidence. Finally, Montana’s jurisprudence suggests the 
Court will affirm the exclusion of the polygraph-related evidence.  
